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Henri de Waele 
Perspectives on Better Regulation in the  
EU – Between Microscopes and Telescopes 
For most people concerned with ensuring good governance, “Better 
Regulation” (BR) sounds like a nigh irresistible proposition. This is 
especially so when combined with a governmental pledge to be “big 
on big things, small on small things”.1 Under different names, the core 
ideas behind BR have in fact been on the European agenda for several 
decades already. Initially, the recipes were formulated with relative 
ease, undergoing repeated refinements and adjustments over the 
years. 2 As always, however, the proof of the pudding remains entirely 
in the eating: what have been the achievements of the BR program? 
Still today, alas, it does not seem appropriate to unfold a “mission 
accomplished!” banner. 
Definitions of the term “Better Regulation” have varied. The 
eponymous EU program is generally considered to boil down to a set 
of activities and instruments aiming to systematically appraise 
supranational policies and improve their workings. It comprises 
various processes, actors, tools and compacts, including legislative 
 
 
1  J. C. Juncker, “The Juncker Commission: The Right Team to Deliver Change”, 
Brussels, 10 September 2014. Online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
SPEECH-14-585_en.htm. 
2  See e.g. H. Xanthaki, “The Problem of Quality in EU Legislation: What on Earth is 
Really Wrong?”, (2001) 38 Common Market Law Review, pp. 651-676. 
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quality evaluations, consultations, and impact assessments.3 The self-
proclaimed “last chance” Commission of Jean-Claude Juncker that 
took office in 2014 launched a single set of methodological templates 
for BR activities. It moreover decided to reconfigure the existing 
oversight body, rebranding it the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB). 
Also, an inter-institutional agreement was concluded between the 
Commission, Parliament and Council in 2016 that saw them all sign 
up to the carrying out of evidence-based analyses of amendments 
proposed in the Union’s law-making process.4 One particular new 
initiative focused on “regulatory fitness and performance” (REFIT) 
checks, mapping opportunities for simplification and reduction of 
unnecessary costs. 5  A mid-term review was published in 2017, 
followed by a report of the Court of Auditors. In the meanwhile, 
numerous scholars conducted their own inquiries into the subject-
matter.6 With the completion of the Juncker Commission’s term of 
office now close at hand, the time seems ripe to draw up some final 
eulogies or obituaries. 
In such studies, a crucial benchmark may be believed to lie in the 
(experienced quality of the) output. Allegedly however, with the 
choice for mechanisms such as impact assessment and ex-post 
consultation, which invite a wider feedback and participation, high 
public expectations were raised as well with regard to input and 
throughput legitimacy.7 Under REFIT, a specific ambition has been 
the identification of proposals in need of withdrawal, as an essential 
part of the promise to “cut red tape”. Correspondingly, no less than 
 
3  C. Radaelli, “Halfway through the Better Regulation Strategy of the Juncker 
Commission: What Does the Evidence Say?”, (2018) 56 Journal of Common 
Market Studies, p. 85. 
4  O.J. [2016] L 123/1. 
5  European Commission, “Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme – 
Scoreboard Summary”, 24 October 2017, p. 4. 
6  See e.g. S. Garben and I. Govaere (eds.), “The EU Better Regulation Agenda – 
A Critical Assessment” (Oxford: Hart/Bloomsbury 2018). 
7  A. Alemanno, “Better Regulation: Holding Martin Selmayr Accountable”, 
available on SSRN. See: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3251856. 
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73 proposals were retracted in 2015 alone. Yet, due to the lack of 
preceding evidence-based analyses of their merits, this move caused 
an unexpectedly broad upset – amounting to a “false start” in the eyes 
of many commentators. The conceptual fuzziness of the REFIT 
agenda, simultaneously pursuing a set of highly diverse goals, also 
cast persistent doubts with regard to its scientific foundations.8  
In quantitative terms, the operation has nevertheless borne some fruit. 
For instance, the number of Commission outputs at the end of 2018, 
compared to those in 2014, can be seen to accord with the “doing less 
more efficiently” paradigm.9 Commentators have equally lauded the 
novel emphasis on consultation, the effective reform of the RSB, and 
the introduction of ex post evaluations into the policy cycle. All the 
same, the question is left open whether the efforts resulted in an 
enduring, measurable increase in quality of the EU rules. In similar 
vein, the Commission has been said to disingenuously deploy causal 
plots, doomsday scenarios and narrative dramatization in its impact 
assessments, in order to garner consensus and support for the 
proposals it wishes to maintain.10 
The current volume originates in an academic gathering where 
attempts were made to comprehensively take stock of the BR 
program, challenge vested assumptions, and advance the existing 
knowledge base. The four main chapters in this booklet contain a 
digest of two thematic and two sectoral seminar contributions, 
employing innovative telescopic techniques alongside microscopic 
ones. First, Helen Xanthaki outlines an original argument for 
determining the success of the BR program on the basis of its own 
principles and intentions. She identifies several shortcomings in this 
regard, and calls for greater compliance with the formulated 
 
8  Radaelli (n. 2), p. 90. 
9  S. Blockmans et al., What Comes After the Last Chance Commission? (Brussels: 
CEPS 2019), p. 15. The Commission did develop an obfuscating tendency to bundle 
proposals and label them as a single package. See: https://www.politico.eu/ 
article/commission-juncker-less-regulation-promise-falls-short/. 
10  C. Radaelli, C. Dunlop, O. Fritsch, “Narrating Impact Assessment in the European 
Union” (2013) 12 European Political Science, p. 500. 
Henri de Waele 
4 
 
guidelines and tools. To her mind, the alternative only risks to alienate 
EU citizens further. Next, Stijn van Voorst and Ellen Mastenbroek 
present the outcomes of their research on ex-post legislative 
evaluation, exposing that the Commission tends to concentrate on 
evaluating directives and complex legislation. Moreover, it appears 
that evaluations by external evaluators are of higher quality than 
internal evaluations. Overall, they do believe that the Commission has 
upped its game over the years, and performs relatively well on this 
front. Hereafter, in a sectoral assessment of the environmental 
domain, Barbara Beijen zooms in on developments with regard to the 
many directives in the field concerned. In an earlier study, she found 
that several such instruments were poorly aligned with each other, 
that problem definitions were often ill-defined, that their scope was 
very extensive, and often heavily reliant on soft law. According to 
her, despite the grand ambitions that have been formulated, the 
improvements in recent years only seem marginal. Finally, Pieter 
Kuypers delivers his assessment of the BR agenda in the domain of 
public procurement. One of the goals here has been to make the rules 
more accessible. Kuypers notes, however, that the volume of 
legislation over the last decade has doubled, and became increasingly 
detailed instead. He proposes a reversion to simpler wording, as well 
as an outright decrease in legislation, also with an eye to avoiding 
gold-plating – the maligned practice of Member States going wholly 
or partially beyond EU requirements in their domestic 
implementation.  
At the end of the seminar, it was argued that contemporary researchers 
have just begun to scratch the surface of BR policies and outputs, and 
obviously, the selected contributions provide plenty of food for 
further thought themselves. The concluding roundtable morphed into 
a flagging of cross-cutting issues that are yet to be addressed 
satisfactorily. For starters, one may wonder whether it is ultimately 
most advisable to resort to quantitative or rather to qualitative 
parameters when gauging the success of any regulatory improvement 
scheme. The ever-increasing complexity of modern society suggests 
Perspectives on Better Regulation in the EU –  
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an ever-fading feasibility of numerical reductions, with every new 
opening demanding the imposition of new constraints. Contrary to an 
established wisdom, “less” could thus never truly mean “more” here 
(notwithstanding that, preferably, the individual rules within an 
inevitable large quantity are themselves kept as compact as possible 
– as convincingly argued elsewhere in this volume).  
Second, there was the well-received opinion from multiple panelists 
that Better Regulation boils down to a necessarily continuous PR 
exercise. In other words, because of its structural appeal in the eyes 
of the public-at-large, no government can reasonably go without it; 
small wonder then that the EU keeps bringing it up. One might add 
that if the underlying idea had been properly internalized, there would 
indeed no longer be any need to trumpet it so loud and often.  
A third daring thesis pertained to the correct level of realization, 
whereby a BR program pushed predominantly “from the top” was 
considered bound to remain limited in effect. After all, its success will 
always stay critically dependent on a proper execution “further down 
the line”. Specifically in a polity that spans over two dozen countries 
with peculiar national idiosyncrasies and constitutional power 
divisions, this would appear to call for a principal realism and 
humility amongst the supranational nomenclature.  
At the panel’s closing, it was advocated that the popular creed of 
“doing less more efficiently” might well constitute a dual 
impossibility: instead, one ought to focus either on becoming more 
efficient, or on trying to do less. Arguably, the aforementioned slogan 
invokes a classic dilemma, whereas it is simply utopian for an atypical 
organization like the EU to accomplish both at the same time. 
On the whole, similar to the underlying seminar, this booklet offers 
but a snapshot of the current state of play, politically and 
academically. It hopes to enable readers to broaden their insights in a 
succinct fashion, inspecting the multifarious dimensions of the 
problématique from up close and afar. The timing of the publication 
coincides with the latest BR review of the Commission, completed in 
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the first half of 2019, so that the findings can be neatly juxtaposed. 
Despite the lofty intentions and the tentative achievements so far, it 
must be clear to the key stakeholders that there is still ample work left 
to be done. Whatever the future holds for EU governance, on the 
shoulders of Europe’s governing class continues to rest, as one author 
in this volume puts it, a “mammoth task”.
 7 
 
Helen Xanthaki 
Using Better Regulation as a Methodology 
for Achieving Better EU Legislation –  
A First Approach 
The problem 
The European Union (EU), driven in particular by the cabinet of Frans 
Timmermans, is at the forefront of regulatory innovation. EU 
regulation is widely viewed as a desirable model for innovative 
responses to the popular need for structured, methodologically sound, 
flexible, and easily applicable regulatory response to challenges of 
competitiveness. Effectiveness, of regulation and legislation, is at the 
forefront of the regulatory philosophy of the EU. 
However, despite the popularity of the EU’s regulatory approach, EU 
legislation, which is a main regulatory tool, remains sub-standard. 
One can attribute this legislative ineffectiveness to a number of 
objective factors. First, and the most frequently quoted within EU 
circles, is the inevitable futility of attempting to accommodate within 
a single text a multitude of national legal systems, legal and spoken 
languages, and legislative styles; and to host them all under a 
harmonized umbrella of ever changing aspirations of integration. 
There is little doubt that the hurdles presented in such an effort are, to 
an extent, insurmountable. Second, and well established in 
bibliography, is the lack of an agreed definition of effectiveness, even 
within the EU institutions that seek to achieve it. Effectiveness has 
been defined with reference to regulatory concepts but not yet with 
reference to the legislative product. It is difficult to imagine 
successful reach of an undefined goal. Third, and also well established 
in bibliography, is the relative exclusion of legislation from the 
Helen Xanthaki 
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“Better Regulation Agenda”. In the EU’s past, numerous initiatives 
have been introduced to perfect EU legislation: from the Sutherland 
criteria to Inter-institutional Agreements, to “Better Regulation”. 
They all explore regulation, and post legislative scrutiny, but not 
legislation as a process and a product. One wonders whether this is 
due to the perception that legislation is somehow out of reach for 
regulators (a perception that would be supported by the complexity of 
legislative processes in the EU and the predominance of political 
compromise in the EU legislative procedure) or whether this is due to 
the perception that legislation is out of reach of Better Regulation. 
This paper hypothesizes that “Better Regulation” can and must be 
used to better EU legislation by providing a tested, evidence-based 
methodology that can draw a new strategy for the EU’s legislative 
policy for better EU legislation. 
The question and its methodological validity 
Indeed, such a methodology can derive from the Commission’s 
“Better Regulation Guidelines” (SWD [2017]) as supplemented by 
the 2017 “Better Regulation Toolbox”.1 But, before moving onto the 
application of “Better Regulation” methodology on the EU legislative 
strategy, one has to establish that this would be a methodologically 
valid approach. 
The first question arising here is whether legislation is covered by the 
field of application of the “Better Regulation Agenda”. The toolbox 
clarifies that its tools “cover the relevant aspects of all new initiatives 
and existing policy interventions”; and the guidelines “(…) apply to 
DGs and services involved in the preparation, implementation, 
application or evaluation of EU interventions and associated 
stakeholder consultations”2. One could argue that legislation as a 
product is not conducive to the application of “Better Regulation”. 
 
1  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law 
 /better-regulation-why-and-how/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox_en. 
2  Ibid., Tool 1.1. 
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But legislation as a strategy or policy certainly is. In other words, the 
“Better Regulation Agenda” seems to be rather robustly and expressly 
capable of applying to a new legislative strategy initiative and to all 
existing legislative policy interventions. And so, the “Better 
Regulation Agenda” and tools apply legitimately to a strategy on EU 
legislation. For the purposes of this argument, it is quite irrelevant to 
decide whether the subject of this proposed abstract overarching view 
of EU legislating is really a new strategy or an existing policy, 
although preference would be with the former as EU policies tend to 
be prescribed expressly in the constituting documents of the EU. 
Having established that a new strategy for better EU legislation 
(overarching above DGs and institutions) is within the scope of the 
“Better Regulation Agenda”, and can therefore utilize the “Better 
Regulation” methods and tools, one must address a second question. 
Can “Better Regulation” apply to itself? Since legislation is a tool for 
regulation, can “Better Regulation” self-apply to one of its 
constituting parts? One cannot see why not. Viewing the pursuit for a 
strategy for better EU legislation as an initiative places it within the 
“Better Regulation Agenda”. And focusing on its production by DGs 
and services renders the application of “Better Regulation” applicable 
to a legislative strategy too. 
Applying BR methodology: passing the DECIDE test 
(G 11/12) 
Having established the applicability of “Better Regulation” to a new 
legislative strategy, let us begin the application by placing the new 
strategy under the DECIDE test. This will ensure that a new EU 
legislative strategy can be legitimately and effectively pursued by the 
EU. 
The first element of the DECIDE test invites the identification of the 
key characteristics and type of the proposed initiative. The proposed 
new EU legislative strategy would qualify as a “major” initiative for 
a holistic and principled new strategy for the EU’s legislative 
Helen Xanthaki 
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approach. This classification guides us to the required process, which 
is political validation from the lead Commissioner, Vice-President 
and First Vice-President following an entry created in DECIDE and a 
roadmap agreed with the Secretariat-General. In other words, this new 
initiative can be initiated by the Timmermans cabinet, under whose 
jurisdiction lies “Better Regulation”. It would require political 
support within the leadership team of the Commission, but one would 
expect this to be present if one takes into account the widespread 
support of regulatory innovations so far. The second element of the 
DECIDE test invites the identification of the scope and the objectives 
of the proposed initiative. There seems to be no struggle in doing so. 
The scope of a new legislative strategy would be to achieve better EU 
legislation: since legislation is a tool for regulation, competitiveness 
can be nurtured by a new, less complex and more user-friendly 
legislative net that would invite implementation and effectiveness 
within the EU, and investment and competitiveness from outside the 
EU. “Better Regulation” means “designing EU policies and laws so 
that they achieve their objectives at minimum cost”3: a new legislative 
strategy would support effectiveness and cost efficiency. Moreover, 
one could argue that better EU legislation favors not only companies 
and competitiveness but also EU citizens, thus balancing the financial 
with a social EU profile. Good legislation would enhance the respect 
of subsidiarity and proportionality; would provide the means to 
mainstream sustainable development into the Union’s policies; and 
would contribute to re-establishing direct communication with EU 
citizens, thus facilitating loyalty to the organization and its ideal of 
EU integration.4 
On the point of subsidiarity, is it the EU that should act for a better 
EU legislative strategy? The answer can only be affirmative. This is 
about EU law, designed and produced within the EU. It is the EU and 
the Commission as the main initiator of EU legislation that must take 
the initiative. There is no doubt that member states must learn to share 
 
3  Better Regulation Guidelines, p. 4. 
4  Ibid., p. 4-5. 
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the strategy. After all, “Better Regulation” views EU legislation as a 
shared responsibility. But the steering power must come from the EU 
since results cannot be adequately achieved at the national level 
(subsidiarity principle). At this point, it is worth noting that the 
initiative could be a more holistic one, involving all main EU 
institutions. In Tool 1 of the “Better Regulation Agenda”, the 
European Parliament, Council and Commission reassert their 
recognition that delivering high quality legislation is a joint 
responsibility for legislation meting four criteria. It may be worth 
considering focusing on such legislation as perhaps a trial, and 
involving all three main institutions. Of course, one could apply the 
four conditions to the proposed legislative strategy, thus arguing that, 
if these are met, the initiative can be a joint one. Let us explore the 
legality of this option by assessing the strategy against each criterion.  
One, this is an area where it has the greatest added value for European 
citizens and strengthen the competitiveness and sustainability of the 
Union’s economy. The proposed new legislative strategy fulfils this 
criterion as the identification of its scope under DECIDE proved that 
it would be of great benefit to citizens and companies, balancing the 
EU’s financial and social profile. 
Two, it must deliver the Union’s policy objectives in the simplest, 
most efficient and effective way possible. This is a rather vague 
condition. But there is a solid argument to be made that the most 
efficient and effective legislative step after more than 60 years of 
legislative integration and continuing legislative fragmentation would 
be to pause the introduction of even more, fragmented legislative 
texts. And to now focus on identifying a methodologically sound, 
principled, and “Better Regulation” compliant structure for the EU’s 
legislative approach. 
Three, it must avoid overregulation and unnecessary administrative 
burdens for citizens, administrations and businesses and particularly 
SMEs. This a condition easily met by the proposed initiative. The 
strategy aims to better legislation. Unnecessary regulation and 
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administrative burdens are constitutive elements of the notion of 
effective law, where necessity and simplicity are conditio sine qua 
non. The condition serves as a good reminder to include these two 
elements to the philosophy of the legislative strategy proposed here. 
Four, it must be designed to facilitate transposition and practical 
application. The strategy is indeed designed for practical application, 
this is its whole point. And it does aim to facilitate transposition, as 
effectiveness of EU law is a joint responsibility with the member 
states involving the whole legislative package of EU and national 
implementing legislation. It seems therefore that there is scope to 
investigate the feasibility of a joint initiative of the main institutions 
towards better legislation in application of the Better Regulation 
Tools. 
Finally, DECIDE invites the identification of the “Better Regulation” 
tools to be applied to the proposed new legislative strategy. These 
would be evaluation, impact assessment, implementation plan, and 
public consultation. Let’s take them in turn. 
Proposed BR Tool 1: Evaluation 
Evaluation calls for an assessment on the feasibility and effectiveness 
of the measures proposed against the goals to be achieved. For the 
proposed new legislative strategy this is a truly difficult assessment. 
Not because there is difficulty in reaching a conclusion, but because 
conclusions can be really hard to bear. The question really is whether 
an EU of 27 member states, or more, can really achieve good 
legislation. There is little doubt that this is a mammoth task. Not 
necessarily because of the multiplicity of complexities in a legislature 
for so many diverse jurisdictions, legal terminologies, languages, and 
diverse legal traditions. Not even necessarily because compromise 
lies at the heart of EU law-making. But mainly because the goal 
pursued is effectiveness of legislation, and this is set against a cultural, 
legal, social, financial and political environment.  
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By definition, effective legislation serves the particular requirements 
of a specific executive within the particular environment of the 
jurisdiction. And thus, effectiveness requirements differ between 
diverse environments. The EU has not yet reached a level of 
homogeneity that can allow a single legislative text to serve the same 
effectiveness in all its member states to an adequate degree. Despite 
the levels of standardization and harmonization, the peoples and 
countries of the EU retain their national eccentricities in culture, 
religion, politics, finances, and law. It is this strength of the EU that 
prevents it from achieving effectiveness by means of a single 
legislative text. 
This leads to a mismatch between the regulatory goals of the EU and 
the legislative instruments available to its legislating bodies. 
Effectiveness could be served if the EU were to legislate solely via 
directives, setting common regulatory goals but allowing national 
implementing measures to introduce diverse mechanisms for their 
achievement within each member state. Regulations could prove 
rather ineffective legislative tools, even when their need for 
transposition is regained. The result of this proposed switch to 
directives as the main legislative tool for regulatory effectiveness 
could nurture good legislation at the EU and national levels. The 
downside would be that the EU would have to entrust national drafters 
to achieve effectiveness of the regulatory package by means of 
national transposing regulatory [not necessarily legislative] measures. 
This would require a free-er hand in transposition and an equally free-
er, principled (rather than formalistic) scrutiny of national 
compliance. This may sound simple, but it is not: effective principled 
scrutiny requires an expert level of understanding of legislative 
drafting by national and EU officers alike.    
Helen Xanthaki 
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Proposed BR Tool 2: Impact Assessment 
Having completed the evaluation test, an impact assessment is to 
follow. This is where empirical analysis becomes necessary. One is 
to measure the impact of bad EU regulation and legislation, in order 
to justify the necessity and proportionality of the new strategy and its 
measures. Measuring the cost of bad legislation is by no means a 
simple task, and inevitably a degree of guesswork is on call. What 
makes this task even more complex is the lack of basic data on the 
users of EU legislation. Without knowing who reads EU legislation 
and who relies on it to make decisions on their activities, one cannot 
accurately identify who the subjects on the alleged damage by bad EU 
laws are. Let me explain this point. At the moment, there has been no 
survey identifying who reads EU law: is it just the local authorities of 
the member states, who then use it transpose them into national law, 
or could it be that companies and perhaps even citizens themselves 
resort to EU law to learn about new rights and obligations? Knowing 
who the audience of legislation is can have serious effect on the 
measurements of the impact of bad EU law.  
If the audience of EU law is mainly national authorities, and legal and 
natural persons read the national implementing measures, then the 
possible negative effects of EU legislation may already be eliminated 
by the intervention of national drafters. Measurement of the negative 
effect of EU legislation would relate to its contribution or loss arising 
from the competitiveness of EU industries, the attraction of the EU as 
a foreign investment area, the transposition of EU measures, and any 
administrative burdens. With reference to transposition, this negative 
effect would include losses from the cost of transposition of EU law 
to member states, the cost of late implementation to the EU and the 
other member states, and the cost of non-implementation to the EU 
and other member states. Where these costs are measured, note should 
be taken of the actual cost, namely the cost that is not remedied by 
national legislation. This may lead to a decision that a new strategy 
for EU law is not necessary at all, or that the needs of national 
authorities as the main users of EU legislation can be addressed by 
Using Better Regulation as a Methodology for Achieving Better EU 
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means of a consultation with them and a subsequent possible fine-
tuning of the current drafting techniques.   
If the audience of EU law includes EU citizens, natural and legal 
persons, the game changes dramatically. If lay users make use of the 
principles of direct effect and direct applicability and rely on EU 
instruments for the purposes of claiming their EU rights before the 
national courts and the national authorities, the alleged negative effect 
of EU legislation must be measured by reference to them also. 
Competitiveness of EU industries would be measured as arising from 
EU legislation only, without remedies from national implementation 
measures. The attractiveness of the EU as a foreign investment area 
would relate to the cost of EU laws on the natural and legal persons 
in third countries that set out to select which geographical area in the 
world they intend to invest in. The alleged cost arising from the 
transposition, late implementation or non-implementation of EU 
measures would include costs to the EU, member states, companies, 
and citizens. The negative effect from administrative burdens arising 
from EU legislation would be measured by reference to the EU, the 
member states, and EU citizens natural and legal persons. In all 
probability, acquiring empirical evidence that direct effect and direct 
applicability is used by EU citizens would result in a confirmation 
that a strategy for better EU law is not just justified, but long overdue.  
The survey of users could, if the question is asked, reveal another 
possible user anomaly. Since direct effect and direct applicability are 
justly hailed as conferring power to EU citizens to make use of EU 
legislation directly and without the need for national implementation, 
it is worthwhile to learn if EU citizens themselves make use of these 
tools or whether they leave it to their legal counsellors to do so when 
the matter reaches national courts. Direct effect and direct 
applicability are revolutionary tools that bring EU legislation directly 
to the citizens. If EU citizens do not use them without expert legal 
advice, it is possible that one of the causes could be the alleged user-
unfriendliness of EU legislative texts. Confirmation of user-
unfriendliness of EU legislation could explain, to an extent, the 
Helen Xanthaki 
16 
 
current wave of Euroscepticism in quite a few EU member states: 
directly effective and directly applicable EU legislation could be a 
tool of communication of the EU directly to EU citizens, a channel to 
alert citizens of the added value offered by the EU. Failing to utilise 
this tool adequately could explain the disturbing prevalence of 
populist voices that ridicule solidly rooted policy options as 
dictatorial impositions from a self-absorbed EU bureaucracy. 
For example, the presentation of EU legislation on cucumbers not as 
a measure protecting EU crops and farmers from disease-prone 
varieties but as a dictation of the extent of curve favored by EU 
bureaucrats. Identifying this as a contributing factor to 
Euroscepticism would upgrade the proposed new EU strategy for 
better legislation to a strategy contributing to the regain of trust and 
popularity of the organization amongst EU citizens, using EU 
legislation as a direct channel of communication between the EU and 
its citizens. This is a view shared by a number of academics apart from 
this author, but it requires empirical confirmation to get it off the 
ground. If it is confirmed, then Brexit can be added to the cost of bad 
EU legislation, strengthening the voice for a new strategy on better 
EU law even further. It is worth noting that such an approach to EU 
legislation would not be out of tune with approaches to legislation at 
the national level. The UK Good Law survey showed beyond doubt 
that users of legislation in the UK are lay persons by 70%.5 As a 
result, UK laws are now drafted in lay language, the regulatory 
message strengthened by user-friendly explanatory notes, and 
legislative texts are available online. Similar movements are evident 
as part of the “Better Regulation” national agendas in the Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and elsewhere: it seems that there is a 
pan-European trend for easily accessible legislation that users can use 
to learn about their rights and obligations directly. 
  
 
5  See further: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/good-law. 
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Proposed BR Tool 3: Public consultation 
The pre-impact assessment survey can produce exciting results that 
may offer a new impetus for the Europhile movement. Public 
consultation would be supplementary to the survey, and could greatly 
contribute to a deeper exploration of the inevitably raw results of the 
survey. A public consultation could, and should, involve hearing from 
EU staff on the current process of legislating. They are the ones 
experienced and interested in EU law-making and transposition 
monitoring. They are the users of processes, and their voice is 
valuable and learned. A public consultation would include drafters 
and policy officers from the member states. They are equally users of 
the system and process of law-making both at the EU and the national 
levels. They carry experience of approaches to legislation and 
legislating for transposition, and could inform on the national 
implementation hurdles and how these could be overcome. 
Technical experts at the EU and national levels may have the learned 
voice but lay users, legal and natural persons citizens of the EU, may 
have considerable contributions to make, if they are proven to be the 
end users of EU legislative texts. Whereas the former may contribute 
in an open consultation with the identification of weaknesses in the 
current process and perhaps devices to address the issues, the latter 
lack the expertise to contribute constructively at this stage. So, 
involving end users in the consultation exercise would require a 
different kind of consultation, perhaps in the form of user testing. 
Having identified the weaknesses and the preferable solutions, end 
users can be mobilized to select their preferred text amongst those 
offered by the consultation experts, thus confirming that the in 
abstract solution offered by the experts is indeed achieving 
accessibility to the end users when applied in practice.   
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Proposed BR Tool 4: Implementation plan 
Having confirmed the necessity of a new strategy and, via 
consultation, decided on its bare skeleton of problems and preferred 
solutions, an implementation plan can now be drawn. Step 1 would 
consist of the identification and profiling of the users of EU 
legislation. It is not enough to know who reads EU legislation. It is 
important to know what it is that users are looking for when reading 
the text. This will allow EU drafters to determine the main regulatory 
message sought by users, and adapt their drafting to provide them 
easily and as a priority.  
Step 2 would involve pitching the language of EU legislative texts 
accordingly. Accessibility includes legislative expression that can be 
understood by the particular audiences of the legislative text in 
question. User testing can also assist here by ascertaining that the 
language used in legislative texts is one that conveys the regulatory 
message to the users rather than the one that sustains the multiple 
compromises required to see the text through. 
Step 3 could involve revisiting the structure of EU texts and dividing 
the regulatory messages according to step 1 conclusions. As there 
rarely, if ever, is a single audience in legislation, a layered approach 
to structure can liberate the drafter in pitching diverse messages in 
various levels of linguistic and legal sophistication that match those 
of each audience. Understanding who reads EU legislation and for 
what purpose can lead to the introduction of a text in parts, each 
addressing lay users, national authorities, and legally trained users. 
Their language would be different, and their regulatory messages 
would be allocated by reference to the answers required by each 
group. For example, a text offering subsidy to oil producers can be 
structured in three parts: part 1 addressed to oil producers telling them 
clearly and simply that they are now entitled to a subsidy and that they 
must fulfil a number of conditions and complete a precise process to 
get it; part 2 addressed to national authorities detailing the 
administrative procedure to be followed; part 3 addressed to lawyers 
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and judges dealing with any consequential amendments, any 
interpretation and definitions, and any appeals. This rather simplified 
example is a good example of a revised structure. 
Step 4 could involve a revisit of the publication of EU legislation. So 
far, EU legislation is available online free of charge, but it is 
addressed to learned users. Bringing the legislation to lay users would 
require new techniques, such as hyperlinks to relevant texts, 
explanatory materials, or variation of colors.   
This is all rather radical, so it is anything but simple! But it is not 
enough. These are suggestions for formalities in drafting techniques 
that reflect a grander philosophical reform in the EU’s legislative 
strategy. A principled approach to EU legislation would see a 
promotion of creative drafting to serve effectiveness rather than the 
current timid formalistic application of models and precedents. Such 
a liberal approach requires confident drafters, and these are normally 
professional drafters. The question is whether, with its current 
constraints, effectiveness can be achieved at EU level. A feasibility 
survey would respond to the question. It is not easy for any 
bureaucracy to reform, and this would be quite a major reform. Can 
the EU sustain it or is effectiveness only possible at the national level. 
Effectiveness by definition requires a homogenous setting with 
similar policy needs and similar policy solutions. EU legislation 
normally places different policy needs at the EU versus each national 
level. The EU looks for homogeneity and standardization in order to 
achieve further integration. National policy goals are obviously 
different and may involve competitiveness or social goals. Solutions 
are by definition different as they aim at different goals. Much more 
so, since effectiveness at each member state may very well require 
different approaches. In a Europe of diversity (north versus south, rich 
versus financial challenged, immigration facing versus immigration 
deferring, etc.), it is difficult to envisage a single policy goal with a 
single devise of redress within all 28 member states. There are two 
options here. One, a holistic reform of the EU law-making processes 
to accommodate the radical reform seemingly necessary for better EU 
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legislation. But such a radical reform seems dangerous and perhaps 
even counterproductive at a time of financial, political, and social 
challenges, which by the way are not solely Europe-based. Two, and 
perhaps rather more feasible, a maintenance of current law-making 
processes, but a reform of drafting techniques to fine-tune EU 
legislative texts in response to the conclusions of the “Better 
Regulation” tools discussed above, along with a principled decision 
to regulate solely or mainly via directives. These beautiful creatures 
are flexible enough to accommodate effectiveness at the EU level in 
the goals and effectiveness at the national level in the options 
available to member states in the achievement of the policy goals set. 
This rather placid solution can produce radical results if the scrutiny 
of national implementing measures is no longer formalistic and 
becomes principled, with a focus to the effectiveness of the proposed 
national implementing measures.  
Conclusions 
The 2017 “Better Regulation” guidelines and toolbox already provide 
principles, guidelines and tools that apply to all EU measures from 
policy conception to implementation. But “Better Regulation” has yet 
to benefit from the self-application of its own principles, guidelines, 
and tools. Applying “Better Regulation” to the EU’s legislative policy 
provides a valuable methodology for an evidence-based new strategy 
for better EU legislation to the benefit of the EU, the member states, 
and EU citizens. The completion of a skeletal DECIDE test for a 
proposed new strategy for the EU’s legislative policy detailed a valid 
step by step methodology for the collection of evidence that can 
constitute an appropriate basis for effective further action. The 
author’s hope is that this paper can become an inspiration for a real 
DECIDE test that can lead to a new principle strategy for better EU 
legislation. There is confidence in hoping that using EU legislation as 
a tool for direct regulatory communication with EU citizens can offer 
effectiveness to EU law, can silence populist Eurosceptic voices, and 
can contribute to a new era of trust and loyalty to the EU ideal. 
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Stijn van Voorst and Ellen Mastenbroek 
The EU’s System for Ex-post Legislative 
Evaluation: Fit for Purpose? 
Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, the European Commission has repeatedly formulated 
the ambition to systematically evaluate all major EU legislation. In 2002-
2003 this ambition resulted in the introduction of impact assessments: reports 
assessing the costs and benefits of legislative proposals. From 2007 onwards 
the Commission also promised to systematically conduct ex-post legislative 
(EPL) evaluations: reports assessing the functioning of regulations and 
directives in force. Some EPL evaluations only study the transposition of EU 
directives to national legislation or their practical implementation; other 
reports (also) assess the (un)intended effects of EU legislation on society. 
Together with impact assessments and public consultations, EPL evaluations 
form the main components of the Commission’s “Better Regulation 
Agenda”1. By assessing the way legislation plays out in a practice, they make 
the EU’s acquis more evidence-based. EPL evaluations can be seen as a key 
instrument to produce high quality legislation, which is to “deliver tangible 
benefits for European citizens and address the common challenges Europe 
faces”.2   
More specifically, such evaluations may at least fulfil two important 
functions related to EU legislation. Firstly, by recommending how the 
implementation of legislation can be improved and/ or how legislation can 
 
1   European Commission, “Better Regulation Toolbox”, SWD (2015) 111. 
2  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council, “Better Regulation: Delivering Better Results for a Stronger 
Union”, COM (2016) 615 final, p. 1. 
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be amended to increase its effectiveness, EPL evaluations are a potential tool 
for decision-makers to learn how their policies can be improved.3  
Secondly, EPL evaluations can be used by actors like the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers to hold the Commission 
accountable for its decisions related to legislative implementation. 4  For 
example, these actors can ask the Commission critical questions based on 
evaluation results.  
This chapter reports of a four-year research project on the European 
Commission’s system of EPL evaluations5, which aimed to assess whether 
the system is fit for purpose. In addressing this question, we focus on three 
necessary conditions for EPL evaluations to contribute to the twin aims of 
learning and accountability: systematic initiation, high quality and 
systematic use. In the following, we describe and explain the variation in 
these three variables, using insights from a large, self-constructed database 
of EPL evaluations.  
This database consists of 313 evaluation reports from the years 2000-2014. 
These reports were collected from a wide variety of sources, including the 
Commission’s websites, databases, work programs and annual evaluation 
 
3  T. Fitzpatrick, “Evaluating Legislation: An Alternative Approach for Evaluating EU 
Internal Market and Services Law”, (2012) 18 Evaluation, p. 479; S. Smismans, 
‘Policy Evaluation in the EU: The Challenges of Linking Ex Ante and Ex Post 
Appraisal’, (2015) 6 European Journal of Risk Regulation, p. 19; E. Vedung, Public 
Policy and Program Evaluation (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1997), p. 109. 
4  T. Fitzpatrick, “Evaluating Legislation: An Alternative Approach for Evaluating EU 
Internal Market and Services Law”, (2012) 18 Evaluation, p. 479; S Højlund, 
“Evaluation in the European Commission – For Accountability or Learning?”, (2015) 
6 European Journal of Risk Regulation, p. 35; European Parliament, Library Briefing 
Policy and Legislative Evaluation in the EU (Brussels: European Union 1990); E. 
Vedung, Public Policy and Program Evaluation (New Brunswick: Transaction, 
1997), p. 109. 
5  This project has resulted in a Ph.D. dissertation, in which further details about the 
methodology and the findings of the project can be found: S. van Voorst, Ex-post 
Legislative Evaluations in the European Commission: Between Technical 
Instruments and Political Tools (Tilburg University, The Netherlands, 2018). The 
current paper is an adapted version of the English summary of the dissertation. 
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overviews, but also our own online searches and EU bookshop.6 We also 
created a second dataset of 277 major regulations and directives enacted 
during 2000-2004, which we used to study the criterion of systematic 
initiation.7 
The Initiation of the Commission’s EPL Evaluations 
The first condition specified above, systematic initiation, means that all 
major legislation should be evaluated. Although EPL evaluations may lead 
to the improvement of specific legislation even if this requirement is not met, 
in that case they will not enhance legislative quality as a whole.8 If the 
Commission conducts EPL evaluations selectively it could also create the 
impression that it decides what legislation to evaluate based on political 
motives.9 Such a reputation could harm the credibility of all its subsequent 
evaluations. Therefore, the Commission has developed the principle of 
systematic evaluation as a cornerstone of its Better Regulation policy; it has  
“…committed itself to evaluate in a proportionate way all EU spending and 
non-spending activities intended to have an impact on society or the 
economy”.10  
How well does the Commission live up to this maxim of systematic 
initiation? Our research11  shows that it has conducted at least one EPL 
evaluation for about 42% of all major EU legislation from 2000-2004. This 
means that more than half of the major EU legislation from this time period 
has never been evaluated. These findings reveal that the Commission only 
partly meets the requirement of systematic initiation. However, the 
proportion of legislation that it has evaluated seems to increase over time, 
since this initiation rate is higher than the 33% found during earlier research 
 
6  S. van Voorst and E. Mastenbroek, “Enforcement Tool or Strategic Instrument? The 
Initiation of Ex-post Legislative Evaluations by the European Commission”, (2017) 
17 European Union Politics, p. 648. 
7  Ibid., p. 647. 
8  OECD, OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015 (Paris: OECD Press, 2015), p. 120. 
9  C.M. Radaelli and A.C.M. Meuwese, “Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: 
Proceduralisation through Impact Assessment in the EU”, (2010) 33 West European 
Politics, p. 145. 
10  European Commission, “Better Regulation Toolbox”, SWD (2015)111, p. 317. 
11  van Voorst and Mastenbroek (n. 6), p. 649. 
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about major legislation from 2000 to 2002.12 Also, some of the legislation 
that was evaluated was studied multiple times: fifteen pieces of legislation 
were evaluated twice, four pieces of legislation were evaluated thrice and 
two pieces of legislation were evaluated four times. 
Our research has shown that four factors significantly affect the variance in 
the initiation of EPL evaluations by the Commission. First, the type of 
legislation matters: directives are more likely to be evaluated than 
regulations. Second, the chances that a piece of legislation is evaluated 
increase with its complexity. Both of these explanations suggest that the 
Commission may prioritize evaluating legislation that grants more freedom 
to the member states, because for such legislation the risk of non-compliance 
is higher. In other words, EPL evaluations may partly be initiated by the 
Commission to make its task of enforcing EU legislation easier.13 
A third significant explanation for the variance in the initiation of EPL 
evaluations by the Commission is the presence of evaluation clauses: 
legislation containing a provision that requires it to be evaluated within a 
given number of years is much more likely to be evaluated than legislation 
without such a provision. Yet, it must be added that the incorporation of 
evaluation clauses does not form a guarantee that an EPL evaluation will take 
place: the Commission has not respected such clauses in 44% of the 
legislation we studied.14 
The fourth significant explanation for the variance in the initiation of EPL 
evaluations lies in evaluation capacity: the availability of sufficient means 
and procedures within an organization to allow it to consistently conduct and 
use high-quality evaluations. 15  Directorates-General (DGs) are the main 
organizational components of the Commission and have considerable 
 
12  E. Mastenbroek, S. van Voorst and A. Meuwese, “Closing the Regulatory Cycle? A 
Metaevaluation of Ex-post Legislative Evaluations by the European Commission”, 
(2016) 23 Journal of European Public Policy, p. 1338. 
13  van Voorst and Mastenbroek (n. 6), p. 651. 
14  van Voorst and Mastenbroek (n. 6), p. 652. 
15  S.B. Nielsen, S. Lemire and M. Skov, “Measuring Evaluation Capacity: Results and 
Implications of a Danish Study”, (2011) 32 American Journal of Evaluation, p. 325. 
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freedom in their evaluation policies,16 so we decided to assess evaluation 
capacity at the DG-level. Our research17 shows that DGs with a specialized 
unit for ex-post evaluations and/ or specific guidelines for EPL evaluations 
evaluate a significantly higher proportion of their legislation than other DGs, 
which confirms that evaluation capacity indeed affects the initiation of EPL 
evaluations in the Commission. 
The Quality of the Commission’s EPL Evaluations 
The second condition, high evaluation quality, means that EPL evaluations 
can only contribute to learning and accountability if they meet certain 
methodological standards.18 If EPL evaluations are not valid and reliable, 
any decisions that take these evaluations into account are based on 
misleading data. A lack of quality can also create the perception among 
decision-makers that evaluation findings misrepresent reality, which makes 
it less likely that such findings will be used for learning in the future 19. 
Our data show that the quality of the Commission’s EPL evaluations that 
assess effectiveness varies considerably.20 The vast majority (76%) of the 
reports that were studied used a robust combination of stakeholder input and 
other forms of data collection. However, the evaluations perform less well 
regarding other aspects of quality. Whereas almost all reports (89%) have a 
well-defined scope in the sense of clearly specified research questions, less 
than 40% of them go beyond this by also describing the intervention logic of 
the legislation that they evaluate. Between 40% and 70% of the EPL 
evaluations meet criteria like the presence of a clear operationalization 
(internal validity), a clear country selection and a clear case selection 
(external validity) and the presence of substantiated conclusions. By far the 
worst aspect of the evaluations’ quality is their replicability: only 31% of the 
 
16  E. Stern, “Evaluation Policy in the European Union and its Institutions”, in: W. 
Trochim, M. Mark & L. Cooksy, Evaluation Policy and Evaluation Practice: New 
Directions for Evaluation, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 2009, p. 71. 
17  van Voorst and Mastenbroek (n. 6), p. 652-653. 
18  OECD, OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015 (Paris: OECD Press, 2015), p. 121. 
19  Mayne & Schwartz, 2005: 1. 
20  S. van Voorst and E. Mastenbroek, “The Quality of the European Commission’s Ex-
post Legislative Evaluations”, in van Voorst (n. 5), p. 136. 
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reports contained or referred to all the material that would be required to 
repeat the underlying research, like interview guides and lists of respondents. 
The key determinant for this variance in evaluation quality is the type of 
evaluator: EPL evaluations conducted by external consultants are of 
significantly higher quality than evaluations conducted internally by the 
Commission.21 This suggests that the technical expertise of external parties 
is a crucial asset when it comes to properly evaluating EU legislation. The 
evaluation capacity of the Commission’s DGs, the complexity of the 
evaluated legislation and various political conditions were found to have no 
effect on the variance in quality.22 The results do show that evaluations of 
legislation that had to be approved by the European Parliament (EP) are of 
higher quality than other evaluations, but more research is needed to find out 
why that causal relation exists. 
The Use of the Commission’s EPL Evaluations 
The third condition, systematic use, means that the results of EPL 
evaluations need to be seriously considered during future decision-making, 
if they have the role of closing the EU regulatory cycle. If this requirement 
is not met, the evaluations are essentially a waste of time and money, as 
without use there is no way in which they can contribute to learning and 
accountability.23 
Our research shows that the results of the Commission EPL’s evaluations are 
frequently used in impact assessments (ex-ante evaluations of the costs and 
benefits of legislative proposals). About 65% of the impact assessments for 
which a prior EPL evaluation is available make use of that evaluation, 
although the level of use varies from making a single reference to an in-depth 
 
21  Ibid., p. 138. 
22  Ibid. 
23  S. Højlund, “Evaluation Use in the Organisational Context – Changing Focus to 
Improve Theory”, (2014) 20 Evaluation, p. 1; J. Mayne, “Issues in Enhancing 
Evaluation Use”, in: M. L. Loud and J. Mayne (eds.), Enhancing Evaluation Use: 
Insights from Internal Evaluation Units, London: Sage 2014. 
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forms of analysis.24 The timeliness of the EPL evaluations turns out to be a 
necessary condition for their use in impact assessments.25 
Besides being a potential source of data for future impact assessments, EPL 
evaluations can also be used for learning in a more general sense, by pointing 
out in what direction European legislation should develop. We expected that 
such use would vary based on the preferences of actors that the Commission 
depends on (like the European Parliament, the Council and major interest 
groups), since proposing legislation that these actors would veto would be a 
waste of time. However, we found no evidence supporting this idea.26 
Instead, it turns out that the Commission’s own political priorities are the 
most important explanation for use. Ever since the Juncker Commission 
entered into office in 2014, the institution has become more reluctant to 
propose new legislation, in part as a response to criticism by Eurosceptics. 
Especially in policy fields that are no priority of the current Commission, it 
has become difficult to translate the results of EPL evaluations into policy 
changes. Conversely, in policy fields that are political priorities of the current 
Commission, there is much opportunity for EPL evaluations to contribute to 
learning.27 
We also studied the use of the Commission’s EPL evaluations by the 
European Parliament. 28  In theory, evaluations are a useful source of 
information for parliamentarians to hold the Commission accountable for its 
decisions. However, in practice only 22% of the EPL evaluations that we 
studied turned out to be mentioned in questions which the EP asked to the 
Commission.29 The only significant explanation for variation in this regard 
 
24  T. van Golen and S. van Voorst, “Towards a Regulatory Cycle? The Use of 
Evaluative Information in Impact Assessments and Ex-post evaluations in the 
European Union” (2016) 7 European Journal of Risk Regulation, p. 398. 
25  Ibid., p. 400. 
26  S. van Voorst and P. Zwaan, “The (Non-) use of Ex-post Legislative Evaluations by 
the European Commission”, (2019) 26 Journal of European Public Policy, p. 378-
379. 
27  Ibid., p. 382. 
28  P. Zwaan, S. van Voorst and E. Mastenbroek, “Ex-post Regulatory Evaluations in 
the European Union: Questioning the Use of Evaluations as Instruments for 
Accountability”, (2016) 82 International Review of Administrative Sciences, no.4. 
29  Ibid., p. 683-684. 
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is the level of conflict between the EP and the Commission: the chances that 
an evaluation is used in questions of the EP is significantly higher for 
evaluations of topics that were controversial during the legislative process 
than for evaluations of other topics.30 
To place the results presented above into perspective, it should be noted that 
most OECD countries do not have systematic procedures for EPL 
evaluations at all,31 which means that the Commission outperforms them by 
default. Furthermore, even the few OECD countries that have systematic 
procedures for EPL evaluations in place – such as the Netherlands – appear 
to face problems concerning their initiation, quality and use, which shows 
that such issues are not unique to the Commission. Therefore, the 
Commission is clearly ahead of or on par with most national systems for EPL 
evaluations. 
General Conclusions 
Some scholars32 suggest that the European Commission is (partly) driven by 
its interest to maximize its competences. When applied to EPL evaluations, 
this theory leads to the expectation that the initiation and quality of such 
evaluations are lower in those cases where the Commission perceives a 
higher risk that negative evaluation results could lead to criticism on its 
competences. However, our results do not confirm this expectation.  
Instead, our research supports the view that the Commission is driven by its 
interest to encourage European integration via the enforcement of EU 
legislation. This seems the most plausible explanation for the fact that the 
Commission is more likely to initiate EPL evaluations in cases where the 
risk of non-compliance by the member states is greater, like directives and 
 
30  Ibid., p. 638. 
31  OECD, OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015 (Paris: OECD Press, 2015), p. 145-
211. 
32  G. Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 65; N. Nugent and M. 
Rhinard, “Is the European Commission Really in Decline?”, (2016) 54 Journal of 
Common Market Studies, p. 1201; M.A. Pollack, “Process, 1970-2008” (Paper 
presented at Conference on Public Finances in the European Union, Brussels, 3-4 
April 2019), p. 9; J. Tallberg, European Governance and Supranational Institutions: 
Making States Comply (Abingdon: Routledge 2003), p. 28. 
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relatively complex legislation. However, more research is needed to be able 
to confirm or reject this interpretation of our results. 
The findings presented above also show that various technical factors affect 
the Commission’s EPL evaluations. It is worth noting that several of these 
variables affect the initiation of the evaluations in the way that we expected, 
but not their quality. For example, whereas we found that DGs with more 
evaluation capacity have evaluated a higher proportion of their legislation, 
we found no similar correlation in relation to quality. In other words, explicit 
evaluation units and guidelines seem to help DGs to produce more EPL 
evaluations, but not necessarily better ones. Similarly, evaluation clauses 
have a positive effect on the initiation of EPL evaluations, but have no effect 
on quality. In other words, our research presents no evidence that such 
clauses cause evaluation to become “tick-the-box exercises” that are 
conducted in a half-hearted way to meet formal obligations. 
These results have several practical implications. First, the findings show 
that evaluation clauses can be a useful tool to encourage the systematic 
initiation of EPL evaluations in the EU, while there is no need to assume 
they will have a negative effect on quality. Second, the results reveal that 
extra investments in evaluation capacity can help the Commission to 
evaluate more legislation. Third, the results show that the timely availability 
of EPL evaluations is crucial to allow their results to be used in impact 
assessments, which shows the importance of strictly enforcing the 
Commission’s “evaluate first” principle. 
For future research, three possibilities stand out. First, since the data used for 
this research process mostly concerns the years 2000-2014, it seems worth 
assessing if recent changes in the Commission’s policies have affected the 
initiation, quality and use of its EPL evaluations. In particular, the 
Commission has published new “Better Regulation” guidelines in 2015, 
which include measured related to EPL evaluations.33 Also, in 2015 the 
Regulatory Scrutiny Board was created as a semi-independent body within 
the Commission, to annually check the quality of a selection of EPL 
 
33  European Commission, “Better Regulation Toolbox”, SWD (2015) 111. 
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evaluations.34 These developments might have affected the extent to which 
the Commission’s system of EPL evaluations contributes to accountability 
and learning. 
A second possibility for future research is to assess the evaluations’ effect 
on long-term learning. Our research project only studied the use of these 
reports for short-term learning and accountability. However, various 
authors35 believe that evaluations which appear to have no impact in the short 
run can still affect political agendas in the long run, for example via the 
diffusion of new ideas. Therefore, it would be worth assessing if the 
Commission’s EPL evaluations can have such effects. A third possibility for 
future research is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the initiation and quality 
of a few specific EPL evaluations. Such case studies could help to find the 
mechanisms behind the correlations that our statistical analyses revealed. 
In conclusion, whereas the Commission’s current system for EPL 
evaluations contributes to learning and accountability to some extent, 
significant further developments regarding the initiation, quality and use of 
these evaluations appear to be necessary for these benefits to become more 
systematic. Hopefully, the specific findings and recommendations presented 
above can contribute to such improvements. In this day and age when EU 
legislation increasingly affects that day-to-day activities of citizens and 
companies and is frequently criticized by Eurosceptic actors, it is all the more 
important to ensure a continuous stream of reliable information about the 
functioning of such legislation is available. If EPL evaluations can fulfil this 
role, they may contribute to step-by-step improvements to the effects of 
legislation, the democratic accountability of the EU’s institutions, and the 
legitimacy of the European project as a whole.
 
 
34  Regulatory Scrutiny Board, Annual Report 2017 (Brussels: European Union, 2018). 
35  G.T. Henry and M.M. Mark, “Beyond Use: Understanding Evaluation’s Influence on 
Attitudes and Actions”, (2003) 24 American Journal of Evaluation, p. 298; J.L. 
Herbert, “Researching Evaluation Influence: A Review of the Literature”, (2014) 38 
Evaluation Review, p. 390. 
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Barbara Beijen
The Quality of Environmental Directives 
Revisited 
Introduction 
My PhD thesis was published in 2010 and concerned the question what role 
European environmental directives themselves had in the occurrence of 
implementation problems in the Member States.1 Now, a good nine years 
later, it is time to look back on the conclusions of my research and to see 
what has changed since then. In the next section, I will first give a short 
description of my thesis and of the main conclusions. Thereafter, I will pay 
attention to some of the developments in the field of “Better Regulation” and 
see if and how they fit with my recommendations. 
The quality of environmental directives in 2010 
The infringement procedure of Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) suggests that Member States are to blame for 
any flaw in the implementation of a directive into national law. The only 
relevant question for the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to answer in an 
infringement procedure is if there was a failure to implement a (provision of 
a) directive. There is no need to prove if there is any blame on the Member 
State. Neither can a Member State prevent a condemnation by proving that 
the implementation gap is not the fault of the Member State, but the 
consequence of for example a gap in the directive. However, the quality of 
the directive can certainly influence the occurrence of implementation 
 
1  B.A. Beijen, De kwaliteit van milieurichtlijnen, Den Haag: Boom Juridische 
uitgevers 2010. For a shorter version in English, see B.A. Beijen, “The 
Implementation of European Environmental Directives: Are Problems Caused by the 
Quality of the Directives?”, (2011) 20 European Energy and Environmental Law 
Review, p. 150-163. 
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problems. If a directive is unclear, or for example in conflict with obligations 
from another directive, this is not problematic for the directive as such, but 
the problems will be felt at the national level when trying to implement it 
into the national framework of legislation. 
In my thesis, I focused on the implementation of environmental directives. I 
did case law research, literature studies, used scoreboards of the European 
Commission and conducted interviews. I looked more specifically at the 
implementation of 10 different environmental directives, in different sectors 
(nature protection, water, waste etc.) to see if there were any common 
patterns to be found. In addition, I researched the implementation of 
environmental directives in three Member States, i.e. the Netherlands, 
Germany and Denmark. The rationale behind this choice was that these three 
countries seemed to be taking environmental law quite seriously, hence 
really putting an effort in the proper implementation of European law. As a 
consequence, failures in the implementation of environmental directives in 
these Member States are more likely to point in the direction of a flaw in the 
directive as a cause of the implementation problem. In less ‘green’ Member 
States, an implementation problem may also just be the result of a lack of 
interest in proper implementation. As a side-note: in the last decade this 
seems to have shifted a bit. These Member States are not as ambitious as 
they used to be.2 
In my thesis, I identified a number of recurring aspects in the directives 
themselves which triggered implementation problems in the Member States. 
Among these aspects were a lack of coherence between directives, problems 
with definitions, a lack of clarity about the scope of directives, some specific 
problems related to the instruments used in the directives and a lack of clarity 
about the meaning and status of soft law. I will elaborate on these problems 
a bit further. 
  
 
2  For the Netherlands, see M.A. Wiering, J.D. Liefferink and B.A. Beijen, “The 
Internal and External Face of Dutch Environmental Policy: A Case of Fading 
Environmental Leadership?” (2018) 81 Environmental Science & Policy, p. 18-25. 
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Coherence between directives 
There is a large number of environmental directives. At the time of my 
research there were over 400.3 Today the number could be a bit lower, 
because some directives have been repealed or merged, but still it remains a 
vast amount. Some of these directives have formal links with each other, 
such as framework directives and daughter directives. This was for example 
the case in the field of air quality.4 In the case of formally linked directives, 
they usually use the same definitions or refer to each other for this. However, 
most directives are more or less stand-alone instruments. They are adopted 
one at a time and at the European level there is no real need to fit them into 
a system or to align them with existing directives. Yet, the Member States 
are supposed to implement them in their national legal system. Of course 
these systems vary from country to country, which is the very reason for the 
use of directives. A lack of coherence will be felt mostly in countries with a 
(more or less) comprehensive act on the environment, as is the case in the 
Netherlands. If a certain term is used with different definitions, it will be 
difficult to use a single definition in the first article of the act, but different 
definitions have to be used for different chapters of the acts. In for example 
Denmark, there are many separate sectoral acts on the environment, allowing 
each act to use its own definition. 
Definitions 
For clarity with regard to the meaning of directives, it is important that they 
contain definitions of the most important terms. Although most directives do 
contain definitions in one of the first articles, this does not mean that there 
are no problems. The definition of for example “waste” has given rise to a 
lot of case law and reflections in literature. The meaning of ‘discharge’ also 
remained unclear for a long time, although it was a key term in the Dangerous 
Substances Directive. 
 
3  Beijen, op. cit., p. 32. 
4  Directive 96/62 (framework directive), 1999/30, 2000/69 and 2002/3 (daughter 
directives), in 2008 replaced by Directive 2008/50.  
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The same term may appear in different directives, but with different 
definitions. This is especially challenging for a Member State wishing to 
implement the directives in a single act. An example was the term 
“installation” in the IPPC Directive, but also used in several other directives 
on heavy industry.5 The introduction of the Industrial Emissions Directive 
solved this problem (see below). 
An unclear definition as such is not a problem for implementation stricto 
sensu, as the unclear definitions can be literally copied into national law. But 
then of course, in the application of the national law, the question will still 
arise how the term should be applied. A final problem relating to the meaning 
of terms is that not all terms are defined, but that their meaning can be 
decisive for the application of a directive. An example is the term 
“significant effect” from the Wild Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive. 
Scope of directives 
Clarity of the scope of a directive is necessary for the proper implementation 
into national law. However, this can prove a problem. An example is the EIA 
Directive, for which several rulings of the ECJ were necessary before the 
actual scope became clear. Take also the Habitats Directive, dating from 
1992, where still new rulings appear clarifying its scope. A recent case 
concerning the question whether a programmatic approach for granting 
permits is in line with the Habitats Directive shows that even after more than 
25 years, Member States are still struggling with the scope of the 
obligations.6 
Specific instruments 
Environmental directives are meant to protect the environment, but this can 
be done in several ways and by prescribing several instruments. Such 
instruments are amongst others environmental quality standards, emission 
standards, product standards, designation of areas, plans and programs, 
 
5  Beijen, op. cit., p. 153. 
6  Judgment of 7 November 2018 in Joint Cases C-293/17 and 294/17, Coöperatie 
Mobilisation for the Environment UA and others. 
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procedural requirements, normatively described goals and standards, 
prohibitions and obligations, rules about enforcement, transitional provisions 
and annexes. A lack of space prevents me from describing the problems with 
each category of instruments more thoroughly, but I will point out at least 
some of them.  
Environmental quality standards are useful to prescribe the result that must 
be achieved by the Member States and leaves it to the Member States how 
to get there. This is perfectly in line with the instrument of a directive and 
the principle of subsidiarity. However, the freedom Member States have in 
achieving the result can also be problematic. Member States are not free to 
take every measure they want in order to achieve the prescribed result, as 
those measures will have to comply with the free movement of goods. This 
blocked for example the prescription of particulate filters for diesel engines.7 
It is also often unclear what the consequences are of exceeding the quality 
standards. It does not mean that no new permits can be granted or that even 
existing permits must be withdrawn.8 For reasons of enforcement, these 
consequences should be spelled out in the directives themselves. 
Soft law 
Soft law can take many different forms. An explanatory memorandum from 
the European Commission is a form of soft law, as are technical documents 
elaborating norms from a directive, Commission recommendations, and 
many other kinds of documents. Soft law is, as the name suggests, by nature 
not binding, but it does often have binding effects in practice. Seen from a 
positive light, it is safer and easier for the Member States to follow soft law 
as compared to hard law. It is easier, because they can just follow the 
interpretation from the document and not have to figure out the exact 
meaning themselves. It is safer, because sticking to an interpretation given 
by the European Commission is a way to prevent infringement procedures. 
However, these documents usually do not have a legal basis, there is (often) 
 
7  Judgment of 27 June 2007 in Case T-182/06, Netherlands v Commission, and 
Judgment of 6 November 2008 in Case C-405/07 P, Netherlands v Commission. 
8  Judgments of 26 May 2011 in Joint Cases C-165/09-167/09, Stichting Natuur en 
Milieu and others.  
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no real democratic control and they may give rise to a shift of power towards 
the Commission. Especially in the light of the tendency of Member States to 
follow the documents, there is only a small chance that these documents are 
challenged before the European Court of Justice. The express reference to 
soft law by the ECJ is limited. In a case against Finland, the ECJ does 
mention a guidance document, but is not explicit about the value of it.9 It 
seems to be just one of the arguments for the Court’s reasoning. Advocates 
General use the guidance documents slightly more often,10 but of course they 
are in a different position than Judges. In cases where these documents do 
play a role (more often preliminary rulings than infringement cases), the ECJ 
emphasizes that it has the final say in the interpretation of European 
legislation, but it does use the documents and attaches at least some value to 
them.11 
Recommendations 
Based on the findings of my earlier research, I formulated some 
recommendations in order to improve the quality of environmental directives 
and to prevent implementation problems following from this. These 
recommendations will be described here in short. 
First and most far-reaching, I suggested to introduce an overarching 
framework directive for the environment, containing the most important 
definitions, general rules on monitoring, reporting and other kinds of 
obligations from directives, and consequences of non-compliance with 
directives. Of course, this was more or less a shot for the moon. It does not 
fit in the European legal system, where all directives in principle have the 
same status. It would also be a gigantic operation not only to create this 
 
9  Judgment of 14 June 2007 in Case C-342/05, Commission v Finland, par. 29. 
10  For example, Opinion of AG Sharpston of 27 February 2014 in Case C-521/12, 
Briels, par. 8-10 and Opinion of AG Léger of 20 January 2011 in Case C-383/09, 
Commission v. France, par. 28. 
11  See: http://www.solar-network.eu for a thorough study on the meaning and use of 
European soft law in the Member States. 
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directive, but also to amend all existing directives so that they become 
aligned with it. 
Another and more feasible recommendation was to reduce the number of 
environmental directives. By combining different directives into a single one 
(or through the use of a framework directive with daughter directives), 
consistency would at least better guaranteed than with the use of multiple 
directives with may be applicable at the same time. 
A directive is meant to give the Member States freedom in form and 
methods12. When a need is felt to lay down very detailed rules in a directive, 
the usage of a regulation instead of a directive should be considered. 
Although a high level of detail may ensure that the directive is clear, it may 
still give rise to implementation problems, as it may be difficult to fit the 
directive into the existing legal system. As a regulation does not have to be 
transposed, this could be the better solution. 
In the Dutch legal system, the explanatory memoranda and the parliamentary 
documents concerning the adoption of an act are an important source of 
information for the interpretation of the act. In the European order, these 
documents are harder to find, and at least in the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
they hardly play a role. Strengthening the position of these documents and 
enhancing their accessibility might give the Member States guidance in the 
implementation process. 
As described above, there is a lot of soft law in many forms and appearances, 
but its status is unclear. More clarity on its status could also be of great help 
to the Member States: are they supposed to follow soft law documents, or 
are they expected to be very critical about this and not rely on it to easily? 
This recommendation is in line with the previous one. Explanatory 
memoranda could even be considered as a sort of soft law and being a help 
for the Member States. 
Specifically for environmental law, in case directives prescribe 
environmental quality standards, Member States could be supported by not 
only prescribing these but also creating a supportive policy at the European 
 
12  See Article 288 TFEU. 
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level, creating legal instruments helping the Member States to achieve the 
quality standards. For example, in the field of air quality, more stringent rules 
on the emission of cars/ trucks/ factories etc. would help the Member States 
to realize the prescribed quality standards. The consequences of a new 
proposal are not always clear in advance. It could be helpful to let a small 
number of Member States make an impact assessment on the basis of a draft 
directive and use the results in the legislative procedure. This helps to 
identify problems beforehand, at a moment when it is still possible to make 
changes to the proposal. 
Looking back on these recommendations anno 2019, I still believe they can 
contribute to enhancing the quality of environmental directive. However, I 
do not foresee the proposed overarching framework directive anywhere in 
the near future. As mentioned, it does not fit well in the system of European 
law, and there are simpler solutions for the same problem. Aligning 
definitions can also be done by using the same definitions in different 
directives; and general rules on monitoring, reporting and so on can also be 
created by drafting a general set of provisions and copying them in different 
directives. 
Developments in environmental legislation 
Since 2010, the quality of legislation has received a lot of attention at the 
European level, amongst other things in the “Better Regulation” program. 
The fact that it was the main focus of the First Vice-President in the Juncker 
Commission (2014-2019) illustrates the importance of this theme. I will now 
analyze some aspects of the “Better Regulation” program that are aimed at 
improving the quality of legislation in the environmental field. 
Recasting 
Recasting is a way to make legislation more streamlined, by combining an 
act and the amendments to the act, or by combining to adjacent directives 
into a single instrument.13 This has been done in the field of environmental 
 
13  See: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/recasting_en.htm.  
The Quality of Environmental Directives Revisited 
39 
 
law over the last decade, with the Industrial Emissions Directive 2010/75/EU 
(IED) as the most prominent example. This recast repealed seven different 
environmental directives, and the directives amending them. Recasting thus 
fits in very well with my recommendation to reduce the number of directives. 
Fitness checks 
Another means to improve the quality of legislation is by performing “fitness 
checks”. The EU define this as follows:  
“[C]omprehensive policy evaluations assessing whether the regulatory 
framework for a policy sector is fit for purpose. Their aim is to identify 
excessive regulatory burdens, overlaps, gaps, inconsistencies and/or obsolete 
measures which may have appeared over time, and to help to identify the 
cumulative impact of legislation. Their findings will serve as a basis for 
drawing policy conclusions on the future of the relevant regulatory 
framework.”14 
Identifying overlaps, gaps and inconsistencies is very important, as my 
analysis of EU environmental law revealed that this is at least quite regularly 
a problem. The fitness check of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC 
(WFD) is being carried out at the time of writing, with a consultation that 
took place between September 2018 and March 2019.15 
Focus on implementation 
With the Environmental Implementation Review, the Commission created a 
tool to better monitor the implementation of European environmental law in 
the Member States.16 It was introduced in 2016, so experience with it is still 
limited, but it provides two-yearly country reports on implementation. 
Especially after some time, these reports could reveal trends and problems 
in implementation. Such reports can thus contain valuable information, yet 
for the improvement of the quality of legislation it is more important what is 
done with this information. Hopefully implementation problems will not 
 
14  See: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/evaluation/docs/fitness_checks_ 2012_ 
en.pdf.  
15  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-5128184/ 
public-consultation_en.  
16  See: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eir/index_en.htm. 
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only be blamed on the Member States, but will also be used in the evaluation 
of legislation. 
Impact assessments 
Impact assessments are a way to analyze the expected effects of legislative 
proposals. 17  This is a very important instrument to identify possible 
problems beforehand, at a moment that it is relatively easy to adapt the 
pending proposals. My original recommendation was to let impact 
assessments be conducted by a number of Member States and not only at the 
European level; however, a thorough impact assessment at the European 
level can still provide valuable information to prevent implementation 
problems. 
Make it Work 
“Make it Work” is not an initiative of the European Commission, but of a 
number of Member States. The project aims to improve European 
environmental law, particularly by establishing a more coherent and 
consistent framework of law through developing drafting principles on the 
use of cross-cutting instruments and procedures in EU environmental 
directives and regulations. 18  The Make it Work team created drafting 
principles for environmental reporting 19  and principles on drafting 
provisions on compliance insurance.20  
The fact that this network was initiated by the Member States shows that the 
need was felt to create more uniform rules on certain cross-cutting subjects, 
which is perfectly in line with my original conclusion that specific problems 
are caused by instruments such as reporting and inspection. My 
recommendation was to introduce general rules on these subjects in an 
 
17  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposinglaw/ 
impact-assessments_en.  
18  See: http://minisites.ieep.eu/work-areas/environmental-governance/better-regulation 
/make-it-work/home/.  
19  See: http://minisites.ieep.eu/work-areas/environmental-governance/better-regulation 
/make-it-work/subjects/2016/08/monitoring-and-reporting. 
20  See: http://minisites.ieep.eu/assets/1791/MiW_drafting_principles_on_ compliance 
assurance_July_2015.pdf. 
The Quality of Environmental Directives Revisited 
41 
 
overarching framework directive. Yet, drafting principles like these are a 
very good alternative, as they also encourage the European legislator to use 
standard provisions on such subjects. It is still possible to deviate from the 
standard, but at least that would require thorough consideration. However, 
the drafting provisions are only adopted by the Make it Work team. It would 
be good if the Commission adopted them as well, and for example integrated 
them in manuals on legislative drafting, possibly in a specific version for 
environmental legislation. 
Conclusion 
This contribution has made clear that the quality of environmental directives 
is a vivid subject, which has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In 
the light of the recommendations of my earlier study, the developments since 
then, described above, should all be welcomed, as they can contribute to a 
higher quality of environmental directives and a decrease of implementation 
problems. However, the quality of legislation is a subject which demands 
constant attention. Although some of the problems described above are 
definitely smaller today than they were in 2010 (e.g. due to the recasting of 
directives), none of them have been solved completely. This means that the 
recommendations formulated earlier are still relevant points of attention 
when drafting new directives, or when evaluating and adapting existing ones. 
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Pieter Kuypers 
Better Regulation in EU Public Procurement 
Law 
Introduction 
The European Commission recently stated that “Better Regulation matters”.1 
Although this may come across as a rather trite statement, over the last years, 
the Commission has indeed realized that adopting regulation at EU level – 
or in other words “regulation from Brussels” – is regularly received with 
criticism: the principle of subsidiarity is not respected, rules are too 
complicated, there are too many exceptions, etc.2 Therefore, the Commission 
has emphasised the need to reduce the volume of secondary legislation, and 
as discussed in the introduction to this volume, it has proposed notably fewer 
new proposals in recent years. Also in the field of EU public procurement 
law however, one may raise pertinent questions on the quality dimension.  
In this contribution, I would like to set out some personal views on the 
“Better Regulation” program in the realm of EU public procurement law. 
Below, this contribution starts off by providing some insight into the 
relevance of this particular field. Hereafter, I will briefly explain the legal 
framework and key elements. Next, I shall try to assess the most obvious 
shortcomings of the regulation in this specific domain. In the penultimate 
section, I mention some solutions and deal with outstanding problems, 
summing up the key challenges ahead. The final section concludes. 
 
1  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council, “Better Regulation: Delivering better results for a stronger 
Union”, COM (2016) 615 final, p. 2. 
2  See e.g. W.J.M. Voermans, “Concern about the Quality of EU Legislation: What 
Kind of Problem, by What Kind of Standards?”, (2009) 2 Erasmus Law Review, p. 
59.  
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Public Procurement: What is it all about? 
For the purposes of this contribution, EU public procurement law can be 
summarised in accordance with the definition in Article 1 Directive 
2014/24/EU: 
“1. (…) rules on the procedures for procurement by contracting authorities 
with respect to public contracts as well as design contests, whose value is 
estimated to be not less than the thresholds laid down in Article 4.  
2. Procurement within the meaning of this Directive is the acquisition by 
means of a public contract of works, supplies or services by one or more 
contracting authorities from economic operators chosen by those contracting 
authorities, whether or not the works, supplies or services are intended for a 
public purpose.” 
The key elements are: 
1. The acquisition of works, services and/ or supplies, by  
2. contracting authorities (essentially: the public sector and bodies 
governed by public law) with a pecuniary interest, with  
3. an estimated value above the thresholds.  
Public procurement law affects a substantial share of world trade, amounting 
to more than EUR 1.3 trillion per year.3 In the European Union, the public 
purchase of goods, services and works has been estimated to be worth of 
approximately 14%-16% of GDP.4 In some countries, the share of public 
procurement in terms of the GDP is even higher. In the Netherlands, for 
example, the central and sub-central authorities engage in buying at an 
estimated figure of EUR 73.3 billion per year. 
  
 
3  See: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement_en. Included are 
public procurement commitments under the World Trade Organization’s Agreement 
on Public Procurement (GPA). Not the entire value of public procurement is therefore 
included. The WTO has a slightly different estimate, namely EUR 1.7 trillion; see: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm. 
4  The websites http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement 
and http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement mention slightly 
different figures, but the range is the same. At WTO level, public procurement 
accounts for 15-20% of global GDP and the economies of many countries around the 
world fall within this range. 
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Aims, key principles and legal framework of public 
procurement 
From the outset, it must be emphasized that the objectives of public 
procurement are particular to the Member State and case at hand. At the EU 
level, the following policy objectives are widely accepted:5 
 To ensure wider uptake of innovative, green, and social procurement; 
 To professionalize public buyers; 
 To increase access to procurement markets; 
 To improve transparency, integrity and data; 
 To boost the digital transformation of procurement; 
 To promote that authorities are buying together. 
In public procurement law, these aims stand next to what may be called its 
original objective: to establish an internal market for public procurement 
through harmonization. In order to achieve these aims, there are rules that 
basically result from the principles of public procurement. In turn, these 
principles originate in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). They are: 
Principle 1: Equal Treatment 
Within the framework of public procurement, all potential interested parties 
and bidders for public contracts and concessions must be treated equally and 
without any distinction. Without doubt, this is the most important principle 
in public procurement. It is codified in Article 18 of Directive 2014/24/EU, 
and reference is made in the first recital of the Directive. This principle does 
not mean that different situations or economic operators cannot be treated 
differently, but from the perspective of the contracting authority all parties 
in a same position must be treated equally. 
Principle 2: Non-discrimination 
Contracting authorities should not make any difference between the potential 
bidders on the basis of nationality, gender, etc. Indirect discrimination 
particularly deserves attention, and over de years, direct discrimination is 
 
5  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/public-procurement_en#objectives. 
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becoming increasingly the exception. This principle can also be found in 
Article 18 of Directive 2014/24/EU.6 
Principle 3: Transparency 
The principle of transparency provides that the contracting authority should 
maintain a significant sufficient level of transparency before, during and 
after the public procurement process. It results from the previous two 
principles. A contracting authority should not only respect the principle of 
transparency before the procedure and on the moment of announcement of 
the contract notice, but also during the procedure and even after the 
contracting. The principle is codified in Article 18 of Directive 2014/24/EU, 
and further developed by the Court of Justice. The latter e.g. held in its 
Telaustria judgment:7 
“That obligation of transparency which is imposed on the contracting 
authority consists in ensuring, for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a 
degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up 
to competition and the impartiality of procurement procedures to be 
reviewed.” 
In later judgments, the Court extended the principle to other phases of the 
public procurement process. Its importance cannot be underestimated in a 
situation where the contracting authority is dominant in the public 
procurement process. 
Principle 4: Proportionality 
The proportionality principle means that, to achieve the aims of public 
procurement, the EU will only take the action it needs to, and nothing more. 
The principle is enshrined in Article 5 TFEU, which states:  
“The content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaties.” 
A contracting authority must always balance the necessity and 
proportionality of requirements, conditions, demands, technical 
 
6  For an analysis of the first two principles, see R. Nielsen, “Discrimination and 
Equality in Public Procurement”; Paper available at: http://arbetsratt.juridicum.su.se 
/filer/pdf/klaw46/discrimination.procurement.pdf.  
7  Judgment of 7 December 2000 in Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH, par. 64. 
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specifications, etc. in public procurement procedures with the aims it intends 
to realize. Article 18 of Directive 2014/24/EU confirms the application of 
the proportionality principle in public procurement. Even decisions by the 
contracting authority, such as in the field of exclusion of economic operators, 
must be in proportion to the goal that the contracting authority aims to 
realize. In The Netherlands, the application of the principle of proportionality 
in public procurement is further regulated in Article 1.10 of the 
Aanbestedingswet 2012 and the Gids Proportionaliteit. This Proportionality 
Guide intends in particular to ensure that all requirements imposed by a 
contracting authority are proportionate to the object and scope of the public 
contract. Article 1.10 paragraph 3 of the Dutch Public Procurement Act 
(Aanbestedingswet 2012) states that the Proportionality Guide is to be 
considered as a mandatory guideline. The latter elaborates on the application 
of the principle of proportionality and how it should be applied in 
procurement procedures. Accordingly, the application of the Proportionality 
Guide should strengthen the position of small and medium-sized enterprises 
during tender procedures. Article 1.10 paragraph 4 of the Dutch Procurement 
Act stipulates that contracting authorities may only deviate from the detailed 
provisions on proportionality if this is properly motivated in the tender 
documents (“comply or explain”). 
Principle 5: Mutual Recognition 
For the establishment of one internal market, the principle of mutual 
recognition is important. Mutual recognition promotes economic integration 
and increased trade between the Member States. On top of the previous 
principles, contracting authorities must guarantee a level playing field 
among economic operators from different countries. In this respect, 
contracting authorities must accept that, although conditions might not be 
identical, certificates, awards, etc. from other member states are all 
equivalent. Even though at certain points the requirements for a certificate 
might differ, the contracting authority cannot impose a (national) certificate 
as condition for award of a contract. 
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Principle 6: Effective Competition 
Effective competition will exist if in the period between the notice of the 
contract and the actual bid several economic operators had effective and 
equal access to the tender documents, and if the tender documentation 
enables several economic operators to make a bid. In my view, effective 
competition is an aim of public procurement, because without competition, 
it simply does not work: a best price quality ratio can only be reached if 
effective competition regarding the public contract or concession actually 
takes place. Effective competition is thus a condition which must be tested 
in any and all public procurement procedures. These general principles have 
mostly been recognized in the case law of the European Court of Justice. 
Later on, they have all been enshrined in EU secondary law. Accordingly, 
the overall volume of regulation of public procurement has undergone a 
steep increase over the last 40 years. During this period, the Union (and the 
Economic Community that preceded it) adopted six generations of directives 
in the field of public contracts. In 2014, the EU adopted for the very first 
time a directive on public concessions. This extensive body of secondary law 
is nowadays related to substance, as well as to enforcement and remedies. 
Outside the general scope of public procurement regulation, there is separate 
legislation on defense and security procurement (Directive 2009/ 81/ EC). 
Yet, these particular procurement rules are very specific, covering only a 
limited part of the procurement volume and can thus be left aside. Within the 
framework of this contribution, we may also omit a discussion of the 
differences between the directives between the first generation of 1971, and 
the latest generation of 2014. For sure this would be interesting, as the 
changes in the public procurement directives are numerous. For reasons of 
space however, the focus lies on the most recent generation of 2014, when 
the Directives 2014/ 23/ EU (Concession Directive), 2014/ 24/ EU (General 
Directive) and 2014/ 25/ EU (Special Sector Directive) were adopted. These 
measures all had to be transposed in national legislation by 18 April 2016.8 
 
8  The Netherlands ran slightly late in transposition and modified the Aanbestedingswet 
2012 only as per 1 July 2019. 
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Possibilities of Better Regulation 
Before answering the question “What are the possibilities for Better 
Regulation in EU law?” with regard to this specific domain, it is first 
necessary to define what “Better Regulation” in the field of public 
procurement entails. Let us proceed from the European Commission’s own 
definition:9 
“‘Better Regulation’ means designing EU policies and laws so that they 
achieve their objectives at minimum cost. Better Regulation is not about 
regulating or deregulating. It is a way of working to ensure that political 
decisions are prepared in an open, transparent manner, informed by the best 
available evidence and backed by the comprehensive involvement of 
stakeholders. This is necessary to ensure that the Union's interventions respect 
the overarching principles of subsidiarity and proportionality i.e. acting only 
where necessary at EU level and in a way that does not go beyond what is 
needed to resolve the problem. Better Regulation also provides the means to 
mainstream sustainable development into the Union’s policies.” 
Obviously, this is a very general definition of “Better Regulation” at EU 
level. For public procurement, the definition must be linked to the aims and 
principles of this field of law. Crucial is that public procurement is ultimately 
enhanced, in terms of both effectiveness and results. New regulation must 
therefore be more effective and providing results compared to previous 
generations. Tentatively, the following key elements may be considered 
when determining whether new public procurement rules are considered to 
constitute “Better Regulation”. 
Element 1: Transparency  
The legislative process for secondary EU legislation in the field of public 
procurement should be transparent, as well as the public procurement 
procedure itself. In this respect, there is definitely room for improvement. It 
is clear that too many changes in the latest generation of directives were 
introduced through amendments in the procedure, and that there has hardly 
been any reference to the views expressed by the Member States in the 
legislative process. In the 2014 generation, the European Parliament 
introduced more than 1000 amendments, sometimes badly prepared. In the 
 
9  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/better-regulation-guidelines-better-
regulation-commission.pdf.  
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Parking Brixen case,10 the Court introduced as a clear condition for quasi in-
house procurement that no private capital should be involved (presumably to 
avoid distortions of the market and state aid). However, the attempted 
codification in Article 12 Directive 2014/24/EU reads: 
“1. A public contract awarded by a contracting authority to a legal person 
governed by private or public law shall fall outside the scope of this Directive 
where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: 
(a) (…);  
(b) (…) and  
(c) there is no direct private capital participation in the controlled legal person 
with the exception of non-controlling and non-blocking forms of private 
capital participation required by national legislative provisions, in conformity 
with the Treaties, which do not exert a decisive influence on the controlled 
legal person.” 
This exception is entirely new, and was not part of the Commission proposal. 
Yet, any explanation on its meaning is lacking. This hardly amounts to (the 
creation of) a transparent new rule in public procurement. In Dutch 
legislation, it is furthermore a rather odd provision: there are no national 
legislative provisions that require non-controlling or non-blocking forms of 
private capital participation. 
Element 2: Accessibility 
Public procurement rules should be accessible for users and practitioners. 
Accessibility is at least suboptimal at the present moment: not all judgments 
of the Court in the field of public procurement law are translated into all EU 
languages, and the directives are difficult to interpret. Although it is certainly 
an improvement that a part of the case law of the Court has meanwhile been 
codified, some provisions, for instance Article 12 of Directive 2014/24/EU, 
are still not accessible and even deviate in several respects from prior case 
law. Another example is Article 72 on the modification of contracts during 
their term. This is a difficult and cascade-like provision, leaving several 
issues unaddressed, which will certainly give rise to preliminary reference 
questions.  
 
10  Judgment of 13 October 2005 in Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen, par. 67. 
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Element 3: Simplicity 
To a certain extent, “Better Regulation” in the field of public procurement 
law also amounts to (a need for) more simplicity. Rules in public 
procurement have sometimes become a bit like an Emmenthal cheese, with 
a clear substantive law part, but also significant holes used by contracting 
authorities to escape from the demands of effective and transparent 
procurement. As an example may be mentioned the introduction of life-cycle 
costing. Article 68 paragraph 1 of Directive 2014/24/EU reads: 
“1. Life-cycle costing shall to the extent relevant cover parts or all of the 
following costs over the life cycle of a product, service or works:  
(a) (…);  
(b) costs imputed to environmental externalities linked to the product, service 
or works during its life cycle, provided their monetary value can be 
determined and verified; such costs may include the cost of emissions of 
greenhouse gases and of other pollutant emissions and other climate change 
mitigation costs.” 
The introduction of life-cycle costing is an improvement, but the provision 
under (b) makes the use of this award criterion unnecessary complicated for 
the average contracting authority. 
Element 4: Low (Financial) Contracting Burdens 
Public procurement is essentially about contracting. A decreased burden for 
contracting authorities and economic operators will be beneficial for both. 
One of the criticisms regarding public procurement legislation pertains to the 
administrative burden for contracting authorities and economic operators. In 
most discussions, this is translated into a financial burden for the economic 
operator. Although in most of these discussions, parties tend to forget that an 
investment is also needed in private commercial activities, the burden in 
public procurement might be significantly higher. An alleged burden on both 
sides certainly has a disadvantage, because the cost of contracting will 
ultimately be passed on to taxpayers, or calculated in the cost of works, 
services or supplies. For the public sector, prices will presumably go up: the 
time and money invested in obtaining the bid will have to be earned back. 
Contracting authorities will increase their staffing in order to organize 
properly public procurement. Apart from these arguments, economic 
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operators might not be prepared to tender, or avoid participating in tenders 
if the return on investment (including the tendering costs) is not sufficient. 
This will reduce in the long term competition. Especially in periods of 
economic growth, certain economic operators (operating in higher market 
segments) tend to withdraw from the public markets. The chartered 
accountants in the Netherlands may be mentioned as an example. In the past, 
the ‘Big Four’ audited the public sector. That however left behind the market 
of auditing the books of smaller public entities, as result of a combination of 
increased requirements together with competition aspects. 
Element 5: Availability of Remedies – Effective Review 
Ultimately, in a public procurement procedure, there is one winner.11 All 
other economic operators will face a loss: they made an investment without 
receiving any payback. The question arises how these losing economic 
operators are protected against unlawful act or even wrongful assessments 
of their bids. Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC (the Remedies 
Directives) harmonized the national laws in this field. Yet, this 
harmonization did not mean that remedies cannot be improved.12 First of all, 
in practice there is a certain tension between review of procedures and bids 
by courts or regulatory bodies on the one hand, and a margin of appreciation 
of the contracting authority on the other. Particularly in the field of quality – 
when the best price/quality ratio has been selected as award criterion – there 
must be room for contracting authorities to make an independent assessment 
that contains, at least to a certain extent, elements of subjectivity. We here 
encounter a difficult tension, since objectivity and transparency should be 
the foundations of all evaluations of selections or bids. Secondly, there is a 
tension between transparency on the one hand and protection of confidential 
information of economic operators on the other. Effective remedies are only 
possible if bids are ultimately reviewed by an independent body. Often, the 
review body will not have the expertise to assess the contents, but at least 
 
11  With the exception of framework contracts; see Recital 61 of Directive 2014/24EU 
and Article 33 Directive 2014/24/EU. 
12  See also in this respect: Report from the European Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council on the effectiveness of Directive 89/665/EEC and Directive 
92/13/EC as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC, COM (2017) 28 final. 
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formal aspects and accessible parts of a bid (financing, technical 
requirements, etc.) can be reviewed. 
Element 6: Codification 
One of the important arguments for the sixth generation of public 
procurement directives is the extensive case law on public procurement. The 
Court of Justice of the EU has handed down many judgements with regard 
to the five previous generations of directives in the field. For example, with 
regard to quasi in-house and in-house procurement, these judgments have 
over the years created a patchwork of rules and particular conditions for 
relying on the exception for quasi in-house and in-house procurement. Some 
of these judgements are related to other subjects as well, and difficult to 
find. 13  More importantly, some of these have been interpreted slightly 
differently later. For example, the judgments on a significant cross-border 
interest seem to differ from each other. The latest important judgment in the 
Tecnoedi case underscores that it is still important to examine several 
judgements at the time.14  In other words, a positive aspect of the sixth 
generation, and in this respect a factor leading to Better Regulation, is the 
increase of legal certainty through codification, as pointed out in the second 
recital of Directive 2014/24/EU (“There is also a need to clarify basic notions 
and concepts to ensure legal certainty and to incorporate certain aspects of 
related well-established case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.”). 
Element 7: Secondary Aims – Limitation and Coordination 
Over the last 15 years, the emphasis on green procurement and procurement 
involving environmental aspects has increased. The Court already opened 
the possibility for contracting authorities to include other aspects than price 
and quality in the assessment of bids in the Beentjes case.15 It took quite some 
time before the Court of Justice unequivocally acknowledged in the Max 
 
13  See for example the Judgment of 11 January 2005 in Case C-26/03, Stadt Halle. 
14  Judgment of 6 October 2016 in Case C-318/15, Tecnoedi Costruzioni, par. 22. 
15  Judgment of 20 September 1988 in Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes. 
Pieter Kuypers 
54 
 
Havelaar case 16  that protection of the environment and promotion of 
sustainable development can be realized through public procurement as well. 
This emphasis is clearly visible in, for example, recital 91 of Directive 
2014/24/EU: 
“This Directive clarifies how the contracting authorities can contribute to the 
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development, 
whilst ensuring that they can obtain the best value for money for their 
contracts.” 
In my view, this forms an improvement to the extent that there exists always 
a suspicion that, with the serious differences in ambition between the 
Member States, green procurement might be abused to protect national 
interests and jeopardize the entry of economic operators from other Member 
States. From the “Better Regulation” point of view, a downside is that in 
the directive, there are too many provisions, which are not clearly linked. For 
instance, Articles 18, 62, 67 and 68 (award criteria) and 70 (performance 
conditions) all individually relate to green procurement, yet none of these 
provisions have been visibly interlinked. Therefore, a clear overall picture 
with regard to green procurement is missing. A reduced number of rules and 
more coordinated approach would likely result in “Better Regulation”. 
Element 8: More is Not Better – Reduction of Rules 
It is regrettable that the public procurement directives from generation to 
generation seem to explode qua number of provisions. This leads to a 
diminished accessibility of the field. In particular, one should question 
whether public procurement really needs so many detailed rules. In my view, 
the EU should be more reluctant, and put more on emphasis on the general 
principles of public procurement instead. I would therefore recommend 
reducing the number of rules, but clarify the general principles. National 
legislators could work out the rules in greater detail, possibly adding their 
own, within their own jurisdictions, yet not losing their way when attempting 
to navigate the very formal rules at European level. Not only is “more” not 
automatically “better”, but we also witness an increasing complexity 
between, on the one hand, the rules in the first and second generation, and 
 
16  Judgment of 10 May 2012 in Case C-368/10, Commission v Netherlands.  
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the fifth and sixth generation on the other. One could question whether for 
example Article 26 (choice of procedures) and Article 58 (exclusion 
grounds) of Directive 2014/ 24/ EU should be so complicated.  
Element 9: No Gold-plating 
Gold-plating is the well-known pejorative term to characterize the process 
whereby an EU directive is given an additional remit or level of depth when 
being transposed into the national laws. Some Member States, e.g. the 
Netherlands, seem to engage in such gold-plating in public procurement. The 
pertinent directives have now been transposed into the national laws of most 
EU member states, and more national legislators have been seizing the 
opportunity to add their own rules. From the perspective of economic 
operators, this process should be profoundly regretted. It jeopardizes the 
functioning of the internal market, as it ultimately leads to different 
procedures and requirements for contracts with an estimated value above the 
thresholds. The force of the directives should be that economic operators in 
the EU can as much as possible participate under harmonized conditions. 
Being able to more or less expect the same rules creates more efficiency and 
accessibility of the markets across Member States. Overall, one of the most 
important objectives must be the creation of one internal market for public 
spending. 
The Challenges Ahead 
Within the Member States, EU regulation is presently used for different 
purposes. There are those who place an emphasis on public procurement and 
the economic/ financial result. Accordingly, tenders are awarded for the 
lowest price. Others emphasize that public procurement should lead to less 
corruption, and that regulation should only result in a transparent market for 
public spending. Public procurement rules can however also be used to 
improve the quality of the public sector and create an environmental and 
social impact. The EU legislator maintains an own agenda and tries to strike 
compromises in the discussions between them. The most important 
challenge will be to reach find a good balance between these competing 
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aims. The risk here is that ultimately proposals from the Commission will be 
watered down to “grey”, instead of “better” regulation, lacking clear 
objectives. Therefore, I would dare to call on the EU legislator to reach out 
for a more concise approach in the field concerned, and restrict itself with 
regard to the aims and objectives to be pursued (in contrast to the present six 
aims). But, I do realize this is a tall order in the contemporary EU context. 
The second challenge in my view is the most difficult one: is it possible to 
abolish rules? This is always a difficult question, since the legislator 
considers the establishing of rules as its natural power and the best solution 
to organize public procurement. There are however various rules that create 
unnecessary difficulties. One could imagine that the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality are sufficient for imposing a duty to find a 
reasonable balance between the various aims and rules. In practice though, 
striking this balance is much more complicated. For example, the Dutch 
Proportionality Guide (in total 69 pages) and the Guidelines on Services and 
Supplies (in total 51 pages) seem superfluous from that perspective. Leave 
these matters up to case law, or so I would argue, since application of the 
principle of proportionality calls for a case-by-case approach rather than 
general rules. In public procurement, the proportionality principle ensures 
that all requirements imposed by a contracting authority are proportionate to 
the object and scope of the public contract. Yet also certain hobbies by 
member states might be suitable for abolishment. For instance, the concept 
of “maatschappelijke meerwaarde” (societal added value) in Article 1:4 of 
the Dutch Aanbestedingswet 2012, and an obligation to divide public 
procurement assignments in lots in Article 1:5 there do not seem to 
contribute to Better Regulation at all. Not only at the national level can 
certain rules be abolished though, for EU directives also contain provisions 
that unnecessary complicate public procurement. One could mention for 
example self-cleansing (remedial measures) as a possibility to escape from 
exclusion in tenders, some of the rules in Article 12 of Directive 2014/ 24/ 
EU on the quasi in-house and in- house procurement, in particular the rules 
on participation of private capital, and the exception from the full regime for 
social and other services in Article 38 of Directive 2014/ 24. Public 
procurement can easily do without these rules. 
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Conclusions 
Unfortunately, for over six generations, in approximately 40 years of public 
procurement rules, the trend in the legislation has unfortunately not been one 
towards “Better Regulation”. Unless one considers more rules and increased 
complexity as fitting within the “Better Regulation” program, there is 
instead a tendency towards less transparency and a more extensive set of 
rules. The process itself must definitely become more transparent, as too 
many changes in the process have been enacted without public explanations. 
Ultimately, this will only lead to more case law of the European Court of 
Justice, and probably further divergences between the Member States – a 
development that the sixth generation of public procurement consciously 
tries to avoid. Therefore, “Better Regulation” in public procurement law 
should align with the foundations of the public procurement rules: the 
regulation of the acquisition of works, services and/or supplies. This 
regulation must be accessible, transparent, and display a certain degree of 
simplicity. “Better Regulation” could certainly help to improve the quality 
of the public procurement. In particular, rules with many exceptions could 
be considered for abolition. Overall, it will make public procurement 
regulation more user-friendly for contracting authorities as well as economic 
operators. Most probably, the cost of contracting will be reduced at the same 
time, which is equally beneficial for both. We should not forget that public 
procurement rules ultimately aim to govern a purchasing process, and that in 
these commercial or business transactions, fewer rules may well amount to 
Better Regulation. Moreover, users and practitioners in this field need to be 
able to assess their rights and obligations quickly. In particular in the public 
procurement process – where deadlines are short, and parties risk exclusion 
at considerable commercial disadvantage – such assessments must be easier 
than in other areas of the law where time is less critical. Therefore, indeed: 
“Better Regulation” matters and less might be better! 
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